In Segregation in Texas, Professor Richard Epstein contends that the disparate effect standard can be an “intrusive and unworkable test that combines high administrative expense with threat of welcoming massive abuses by both the courts while the executive branch of government…” Indeed, in the context of payday financing, the disparate effect test can be an unworkable test, however a great deal because of its threat of welcoming massive abuses, but instead when it comes to hefty burden the test places on claimants.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development’s formulation associated with disparate effect test is just a three-part inquiry: at phase one the claimant must show that a specific training possesses “discriminatory impact.” At phase two, the lending company may justify its techniques since they advance some “substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest.” At phase three, the claimant may bypass that reason by showing the genuine ends of “the challenged practice might be served by another training who has a less discriminatory impact.”
Despite the fact that proof of discriminatory intent just isn’t necessary, claimants nevertheless bear a burden that is tough stage one out of showing with sophisticated analytical analysis demonstrable negative effects and recognition associated with accurate practice causing these results.