The PAY DAY LOAN SHOP OF WISCONSIN, INC. d/b/a Madison’s Cash Express, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MADISON, Defendant.
United States Of America District Court, W.D. Wisconsin.
*801 *802 Joseph S. Goode, Milwaukee, WI, for Plaintiff.
Amanda J. Kaiser, Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field, Madison, WI, for Defendant.
CRABB, District Judge.
This will be a civil action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. В§ 1983. Plaintiff The cash advance shop of Wisconsin contends that defendant City of Madison has enacted an ordinance that violates plaintiff’s liberties to protection that is equal due procedure and is unconstitutionally obscure. In addition, plaintiff contends that the ordinance is preempted by state legislation.
Whenever plaintiff filed its problem, it desired an initial injunction to avoid defendant from enforcing the ordinance that is allegedly unconstitutional. Defendant reacted to your movement and presented a movement for summary judgment at the time that is same asserting that the appropriate principles determining the motions had been equivalent. Defendant asked that its movement for summary judgment be addressed without enabling plaintiff time for finding, arguing that any development will be unneeded. I agreed that development will never help plaintiff (because legislative choices are “not susceptible to courtroom factfinding and can even be predicated on logical conjecture unsupported by proof or empirical data,” FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 124 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1993)), and offered its counsel a chance to advise the court whether he desired the opportunity for additional briefing; he published towards the court on August 12, 2004, to state that extra briefing wouldn’t be necessary and therefore the court should go to determine the movement.